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Some Footnotes to the 1945 Statutes
BY ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT*

Certain Session Laws passed by the 1945 legislature which have a
more or less direct bearing upon real estate titles are proper subjects for
some comment.
We note that the inadvertent joker in Section 1 of Chapter 136 of
the Session Laws of 1943 has been repealed by Senate Bill No. 316. As
of April 3, 1945, the publication of a legal notice no longer need be
made in the "county where the subject matter of the legal notice or advertisement is located," but the publication shall be made in the county
where required by law or by the Rules of Civil Procedure or the rules of
court applicable thereto. If your publication conformed to the statute or
to the Rules of Civil Procedure or to the rules of court, and you did not
in addition publish in a county where the subject matter (real estate)
was located, you appear to be safe from attack provided no action is
brought prior to October 3, 1945, to set aside or question your proceedings.

House Bill No. 109 has made some technical corrections in connection with estate proceedings. The amendment to Section 253 of Chapter
176, 1935 C. S. A., which becomes effective July 4, 1945, makes some
definite changes and presents at least five new problems.
I.
The first problem is that involving the form of verification of a
waiver of notice in a proceeding to sell real estate. The old form of
waiver was prescribed by 1935 C. S. A. Suppl. Chapter 176, Section
167. The person executing the waiver "subscribed and swore" to the
verification. In all of the other proceedings involving probate matters
the form of verification was an acknowledgment. The new statute by
the amendment to Section 253 contemplates that the waiver shall be "by
an instrument duly acknowledged." The effect of the new statute is to
make the verification the same for all estate proceedings. It should be
noted, however, that all the old forms which read "subscribed and
sworn to" must be changed after the effective date of the new act, which
is July 4, 1945.
II.
The second problem created by House Bill No. 109 is how much
preliminary effort to obtain personal service must be made before service by publication can be had.
A. Proceeding to Sell Real Estate.
*Of the Denver bar.
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As far as a proceeding to sell real estate is concerned the old statute,
Section 166, Chapter 176, 1935 C. S. A. provided substantially that
service could be had by publication (a) because the person could not be
found in the State of Colorado, or (b) if he resides out of the state, or
(c) any other reason.
Under Section 253 as amended in 1945 you are required to serve
persons in interest (a) personally if they can be found in the State of
Colorado, or (b) personally or by mail if.they can be found and, served
outside the State of Colorado.
The change is that whereas formerly you were able to publish
against those outside the State of Colorado, now you must serve them
either by mail or by personal service if you are able to do so.
The new Section 253 in Subdivision (c) provides that the Rules
of Civil Procedure shall apply except to the extent that the procedure
set forth in Chapter 176 is different. In other words, if there are any
gaps or incomplete statements of procedure in Chapter 176, we should
turn to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the proper method to be followed. With this guiding principle in mind, let us consider the question:
Who is to determine whether the persons in interest in a proceeding to
sell real estate "can be found and served outside the State of Colorado"?
In nearly all cases the papers in the estate proceedings give the names of
the heirs and a street address, or a city and state as an address. It is reasonably apparent that each one of these persons could be served by mail
or by personal service, and the spirit of the new statute apparently requires that such persons must.be so served. The new statute would seem
to provide that you cannot serve non-residents of-Colorado by publication unless you are in fact unable to serve them by mail or by personal
service. If a petition for letters of administration or a petition for probate gives a city and state, or a street address within a city, as the address
of persons in interest, you could not honestly say that those persons
could not be served by mail or by personal service unless some definite
effort had been made either by mailing the notice, which was subsequently not delivered, or by making effort to obtain service by a local
sheriff. Unless the files in the estate affirmatively show that either of such
steps were taken, service by publication would be of questionable validity. Because the very jurisdiction of the court is based on the proper
compliance with statutes relating to service, it is vitally important that
the statute be followed strictly. In the ordinary situation outlined above,
it would seem necessary that you file a motion requesting service by publication and setting forth specifically and in detail why you are unable to
serve non-residents by mail or by personal service. The statute would
further seem to require that a court order should be obtained, based on
the motion, and which authorizes service by publication.
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It must be realized that the procedure which is outlined above is.
not necessarily that prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4
provides that non-residents may be served by publication. It will be seen
that the procedure in estate matters is now more difficult and burdensome
than that in the ordinary civil action. However, for the reason stated
above, it seems necessary for some sort of court order to be obtained upon
some kind of motion supported by some evidence or testimony. I submit
that the County Court has inherent powers which must be broad enough
to permit the motion and order suggested.
This procedure, it will be seen, is considerably more complicated
than required under the former statute; but because Section 166 was
expressly repealed, you definitely cannot use the old affidavit for publication.
B. Proceeding to Admit Will to Probate.
Exactly the same considerations apply to citations to attend probate
of a will and the same procedural steps outlined above must be followed
in obtaining service of a citation to attend probate. (You will note that
House Bill 109, Section 10, expressly repeals Section 51, Ch. 176, 1935
III.
C. S. A.)
The next problem is the number of publications required. In
regard to the sale of real estate, the old statute, 1935 C. S. A., Chapter
176, Section 166, required publication for two successive weeks and the
notice was uniformly published three times. The new statute requires
notice shall be published "once each week during each of four successive
calendar weeks." In Section b of the new statute the quoted portion of
the last sentence is defined as four publications. You will note that at
least five days must elapse between any two publications and at least 19
da.ys must elapse between the first and last publication. This requirement
necessitates new forms of publisher's affidavits to comply with the new
IV.
statute.
The next problem is that involved in what kind of notice is published. As far as probate of a will is concerned, the old statute, 1935
C. S. A., Chapter 176, Section 51, a notice was required to be published
which contained at least five elements and was rather lengthy. The new
statute requires the "citation" to be published. In this latter respect the
new statute appears to simplify the old procedure.
V.
There is a collateral matter connected with all estate proceedings
which involves the service of process on a non-resident minor. By the
adoption of the new Section 253, a blanket rule was made that matters
not covered specifically in the estates chapter (1935 C. S. A., Chapter
176) would be governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Since Rule
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4 (f) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapter 1, was amended effective
February 28, 1945, it is now possible to serve a non-resident minor
under the age of 18 by personal service.
In regard to House Bill No. 498, Section 7-as one Robert Burns
indicated, the best laid plans of mice and men go awry. The inheritance
tax department, with the very commendable desire to cut red tape and to
simplify the payment of inheritance taxes, encouraged the passage of
Section 7, House Bill No. 498, which amended Section 38 of Chapter
85, 1935 C. S. A., as amended by Section 5, Chapter 116, Session Laws
of 1943. The intent of the 1945 statute was to limit the inheritance
lien for a period of 15 years from the date of death and to abolish the
perpetual lien which had existed from 1909. Unfortunately, the 1945
amendment is not effective because our present statute was passed in
1933. In that year, the legislature amended all of the former laws, but
they did not abolish the liens which then existed. The 1945 amendment
states that the tax imposed by "this chapter shall be and remain a lien
• . . for 15 years from date of death". The words "this chapter" refer
to the 1933 statute, and the 1933 statute specifically did not abolish
liens which existed before 1933. Therefore the 1945 statute does not
affect liens which existed prior to 1933. Since 15 years has not
elapsed since 1933, there is no actual limitation in effect and the perpetual lien of inheritance taxes will still exist until 1948 unless the
next legislature remedies the situation.
There is one other statute in which well-intentioned plans did not
materialize.
Senate Bill No. 171 was designed to limit the lien of an unredeemed tax sale to a period of 15 years. However, Section 1 of the
statute refers only to tax certificates which are not issued or assigned to
a city or county or a district levying such taxes.
It is difficult to see how anyone can say positively, for example,
that an unredeemed tax sale certificate issued to John Jones in 1921 for
the general taxes of 1920 is barred. John Jones may at any minute
assign the certificate back to the county or to the city or to the taxing
district. It is common knowledge that assignments of tax certificates
are seldom recorded until the holder applies for treasurer's deed. In
view of this widespread practice, the mere fact that the abstract does
not show an assignment is not conclusive. If such assignment has been
made, or will be made, the 15-year limitation is not applicable and the
lien of the certificate is not barred.
With this loophole in the statute, it seems highly doubtful if a
lawyer examining an abstract of title can pass an unredeemed tax sale
certificate even though it is more than 15 years old,

